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Sabine Ammon 
Language of Architecture.  
Some Reflections on Nelson Goodman’s 
Theory of Symbols1 
Abstract 
This article discusses the status of buildings as works of art. Judging architecture 
cannot be restricted to aesthetics, since architecture is an extremely interdisciplinary 
art. As a ‚joint venture’, the example of architecture shows strengths as well as 
shortcomings of Goodman’s theory of symbols. 
When we try to describe architecture, a serious problem arises. As far as 
the eye can see, there are buildings. People in modern society live in a built 
environment that encompasses everything from the simple wooden shed to 
the skyscraper, including the town house, the tenement block and the office 
block, roads and bridges and landscapes shaped by human design – the list 
goes on and on. But not everything that is built is architecture. So what 
distinguishes the mere built from architectural art? In brief and succinct 
terms, architectural art exists when a building is a work of art. But this 
answer immediately raises another question: when are buildings art? When 
it comes to architecture, most popular definitions of art do not hold.  
Art is what is created by an artist. 
But being an artist’s work does not mean that the object is art. Even 
celebrated architects count among their designs buildings that were simply 
carried out to keep the architectural firm going. And to explain art as what 
an artist creates intentionally is no help either, as artists can have a wide 
array of intentions. Having intentions is no guarantee of keeping them! 
1 Presented in an earlier version at the Congress CATH 2004: Philosophy of 
Architecture. Architecture of Philosophy, 11.7.2004, Bradford, UK. 
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Art is what is created using certain techniques and certain materials. 
Again, architecture demonstrates the absurdity of the attempted 
definition. The building trade today is international, and the same 
techniques and materials are used the world over. Common standards of 
construction apply regardless whether the building is art or not. The way 
something is built does not decide on its status as art. 
Art is what can be judged by aesthetic criteria. 
But an architectural judgement cannot stop at aesthetic questions of 
shape, proportion, or style. Many additional factors have to be considered: 
1. constructional aspects, from structural and technical aspects to the
specific realization of details, choice of materials, and physics, 2. economic 
aspects like the relation of cost and output, 3. ethical aspects of 
sustainability, the consumption of resources and energy, and the impact on 
future generations, 4. psychological aspects investigating the relationship 
of the building to those who live or work in and around it, and 5. 
sociological aspects considering the consequences of the building for a 
community. This list is by no means exhaustive; in fact depending on the 
specific building, other factors differing in priority and relevance may also 
apply. It is crucial to point out that architecture is more than just aesthetics; 
it is a composition of a broad variety of needs and demands. 
If the art of architecture cannot be defined with reference to the artist, 
materials and techniques, or aesthetic criteria, what is left? What is it that 
characterizes architectural art? What distinguishes a work of architectural 
art from the broad mass of buildings? The aim of my contribution is to 
tackle these questions with the help of the philosophy of Nelson Goodman. 
1. The Language of Architecture
Nelson Goodman made an important contribution to the philosophy of 
architecture with his books Languages of Art (1968) and Reconceptions in 
Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences (1988, with Catherine Z. Elgin). 
Embedded in a theory of symbols, he is able to thoroughly investigate the 
arts and sciences as symbolic systems – or, like the book’s title suggests – 
as languages, if ‘language’ is used in a very general sense. Goodman 
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structures his investigation on logical considerations, using terms usually 
restricted to the philosophy of language. This enables him to systematically 
compare such diverse fields as astronomy, biology, music, and 
architecture. 
His theory is based on a broad notion of the symbol. Symbols can be 
anything from demands and queries, words, categories, pictures, diagrams, 
musical passages and performances to buildings (R, 155f). According to 
Goodman, all symbolic functioning goes back to ‘reference’ in its basic 
sense of ‘standing for’. It is the relationship of “a term or other sign or 
symbol and what it refers to” (MM, 55). In its simplest articulation, a 
symbol refers to an object, like most of our words do: for example, the 
term ‘big’ refers to objects of an extraordinary size.  
But a symbol is never isolated; it is always related to other symbols. 
Like colours, symbols differentiate, sort, and systematize. ’Red‘, ’green‘, 
’blue‘, ’orange‘, and many other labels divide our visual field into different 
areas. But none of these categories can act independently; they need their 
partners to define themselves. In this way, clusters of related symbols are 
established. These so-called symbol systems can differ significantly in 
their syntactic and semantic properties. With the help of these criteria, 
Goodman is able to explain the differences among the various symbol 
systems – for example, the differences between physics and literature, the 
everyday world and music, or painting and architecture. 
Within this theoretical framework, Goodman pursues two lines of 
architectural investigation. First, he studies notational systems and their 
relation to the work of architecture in its ultimate built form. By focussing 
on the extent to which the plan determines what is actually built, 
statements can be made about the identification of the building.2 Further 
dimensions of this problem become apparent when the whole planning 
process is examined, which can include everything from the initial sketch 
to the final plan, tender descriptions, CAD, and scale models. Questions 
arise as to whether a virtual architectural model can already be considered 
architecture, and what elements of the planning process determine the form 
in which the building is realized. 
2 S. Fisher has investigated this topic in ‘Architectural Notation and Computer 
Aided Design’ (Fisher 2000). 
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Secondly, Goodman looks at the diverse ways of symbolisation in 
buildings. His investigation is centred on the peculiarities of buildings that 
can be traced back to distinctive features of the symbol system of 
architecture. As my objective is to be able to differentiate among buildings 
in greater detail, I will concentrate on this aspect in the following. 
2. Symbolic Functioning of Buildings
Goodman describes various ways of symbolic functioning, which all 
originate from two main forms of symbolisation: denotation and 
exemplification. Denotation is the simplest form of reference. When we 
study our verbal language, the situation is well known: the label ‘building’ 
refers to buildings. But when do real buildings denote? Denotation can be 
often found in two areas of architecture. On the one hand, there is the 
architecture of follies, which were designed to furnish country estates. The 
entrance of the greenhouse in the grounds of Dunmore Castle in 
Stirlingshire, shaped as a huge stone pineapple, refers to pineapples; the 
many sham castles, built from the outset as decorative ruins, denote ancient 
castles (Jones 1974). On the other hand, we find similar examples when 
looking at what may be termed ‘advertisement architecture’: the juice shop 
in the form of a huge orange symbolizes this fruit, the roof of a fish shop in 
the shape of a fish's body denotes seafood. However, apart from these 
fields, denotation in architecture is rare. A recent example is the 
planetarium of Santiago Calatrava in Valencia, which, together with its 
reflection, denotes an eye composed of eyelid, iris, and lashes. 
Another way of basic symbolic functioning is exemplification: the 
”reference by a sample to a feature of the sample” (MM, 59). Goodman 
speaks of features when a label denotes an object. But not each of an 
object’s features is also exemplified. Only if the sample refers back to the 
label is exemplification taking place. The paradigmatic example of this is a 
tailor’s swatch. The swatch stands for a certain colour or pattern, usually 
not for its size or shape. Exemplification in architecture takes place when 
certain features of a building are exposed. Sometimes the construction of 
buildings is designed to reveal the structure, as architects like Ludwig Mies 
van der Rohe or Norman Foster did. Here, the construction exemplifies, in 
its shape, the building’s structure and the interplay of forces at work within 
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it. In more general terms, exemplification occurs when a certain feature is 
brought out, be it the building’s structure, shell, or roof.  
Based on these rudimentary forms of symbolization are more complex 
ways that buildings make reference. Expression is a special case of 
exemplification, a process of symbolization that is often found in 
architecture. It happens when the denotation of the label is not literal but 
metaphorical. Deconstructivist buildings metaphorically refer to instability 
or dissolution, a palace to grandeur, a church to calm. The New National 
Gallery in Berlin of Mies van der Rohe expresses clarity, plainness, and 
simplicity through its reduced construction and its straight lines. Mediated 
reference takes place if a chain of related symbol processes has been 
established. In the above example of the greenhouse entrance, the chain of 
reference does not stop at the pineapple. During the epoch in which the 
greenhouse was built, the pineapple exemplified the enormous costs 
involved in cultivating it, and thus, in a metaphorical way, luxury and the 
wealth of its proprietor. The shape of the New National Gallery denotes a 
Greek temple, which in turn relates to a temple of art, an allusion to the 
Gallery’s function as a museum of modern painting and sculpture. With 
this, I end the short overview of the various symbol processes at work in 
architecture. The crucial question now is how these forms of symbolization 
help to distinguish architectural art from mere buildings. 
3. Symptoms of Architectural Art
When can we speak of architecture as art? Goodman has a straight answer: 
“A building is a work of art only insofar as it signifies, means, refers, 
symbolizes in some way” (R, 33). The premise is symbolisation: without 
symbolisation, no art. Although symbolisation is the basis of architectural 
art, there are restrictions. Not any reference makes a building a work of 
architectural art. There are many ways buildings mean that are not 
connected to architecture. Political or historical events in particular can 
make buildings signify specific meanings. A building can stand for the 
birth of a nation, a prison can stand for torture, an estate for wealth. In 
order to exclude these forms of signification, symbolisation must be 
understood to somehow depend on the architecture. According to 
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Goodman, architecture only is art when the building functions as an 
aesthetic symbol.  
This specification immediately raises the question of what it is that 
makes a symbol aesthetic. In Goodman's writings we find a general answer 
that is not restricted to architecture. Instead of a definition, he indicates 
several symptoms of the aesthetic that “distinguish or are indicative of the 
symbolizing that constitutes functioning as a work of art” (WW, 67). On 
the level of the symbol, three features occur.3 First, exemplification very 
often indicates art, through both literally and metaphorically possessed 
features. Second, multiple and complex reference is often related to art. 
Here, chains of symbols in various functions refer to an object. A third 
criterion is repleteness when not only one, but rather many aspects of a 
symbol turn out to be relevant. Given a work of art, these symptoms 
usually are fulfilled. However, they need not necessarily be so, they can 
also appear independently of one another.  
To sum it up: architectural art presupposes aesthetic symbolization. 
When we return to the example of the New National Gallery, its status as a 
work of art can be demonstrated with the above criteria. Exemplification is 
part of the symbolisation and there are long chains of reference. Because 
not only the shape, but also the structure and many other elements such as 
columns and facade symbolize, the symbolic functioning of the building 
can be called ’replete‘. When the building refers to other symbols and 
objects as in this case, when it interacts, then it is a symbol in a system of 
architecture – or metaphorically: it is part of the language of architecture. 
Not all buildings are symbols, however: there are also non-symbols and 
non-referential aspects of symbols (R, 156), the paradigm being an 
ordinary wooden shed. When a structure is inactive, when it does not 
relate, when it has no language, then it is just a built edifice, not art. It is a 
mute building.  
3 On the level of the system, two further symptoms must be mentioned: syntactic 
and semantic density. 
327
4. Judging architecture
So far, the investigation has discussed criteria for aesthetic symbolisation. 
But considering only aesthetics, as Goodman does in his writings, does not 
do justice to architecture. As outlined above, architectural art cannot be 
described according to aesthetic criteria alone. Rather, social, 
psychological, economic, structural, and ethical aspects must also be 
included. These aspects are not opposed to aesthetics or architecture, but 
on the contrary are part of what constitutes architectural art. Only if a 
design is an intelligent solution to the economic and structural problem at 
hand are we willing to call the building a successful piece of work. The 
quality of a building shows not only in its shape and the relation of its 
parts, but also, for example, in its ethical implications. It is impossible to 
separate these aspects into different categories, looking for the best 
solution to each and presenting their final sum as architectural art. All 
these components are interdependent, and trade-offs must be made to get 
good results. Architectural art is a highly interdisciplinary ‘joint venture’. 
There are many different questions and tasks a building is confronted with, 
but they must all be solved in order to produce a well-made building, a 
work of art. Therefore, not only aesthetic symbolic functioning has to be 
considered when we try to identify architectural art. Many systems are at 
work within it at the same time, many different ways of symbolic 
functioning are brought together simultaneously. 
How can this be achieved? Putting all these different components 
together is a complex process of interpretation and construction. Any time 
we discuss architectural art – when we design, when we teach, when we 
assess architecture – judgements are involved. Judging means testing the 
symbol, checking its various functions, and trying out its position within 
the system. A judgement in this sense is an active undertaking; it includes 
making and creating. But it is not a situation where anything goes. Rather, 
as Goodman puts it: “Judgements of rightness of a building as a work of 
architecture ... are often in terms of some sort of good fit – fit of the parts 
together and of the whole to context and background” (ibid., 46). The fit is 
constituted by the tension between existing order and innovation, by the 
breaking of rules and the assessment of new ones. In this way, the different 
aspects and components are brought together, their limits are tested, and 
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novel creations emerge. Considering the many systems involved in 
architecture, the fit has to be achieved not only for one system but for 
many systems at the same time. Additionally, dependencies and 
interactions between the systems and resulting effects must be taken into 
account. Precisely these demands represent the specific situation of 
architecture which distinguishes it from many other arts: a situation which 
is not yet adequately grasped by Goodman’s theory of symbols. This is left 
for future research. 
5. Conclusion
Architecture is multi-disciplinary. Its difficulty, but also its challenge 
consists in bringing together dependencies, differing demands, and 
antagonistic methods from such diverse fields as construction, economics, 
ethics, psychology, and sociology. Nelson Goodman’s theory of symbols 
offers only rudimentary assistance and must be developed further as it 
remains restricted to aesthetics. However, Goodman has provided a highly 
interesting approach regarding the problem of differentiation of the 
building as a work of art, an approach that can be extended beyond purely 
aesthetic considerations. His answer to the question of what distinguishes a 
piece of architectural art introduces a new perspective to the discussion of 
architecture. The way a building refers, the way it builds up multiple 
contextual relations, singles it out as a work of art. ”A work of art typically 
means in varied and contrasting and shifting ways and is open to many 
equally good and enlightening interpretations” (ibid., 44). Or, to put it 
metaphorically, a work of art is able to break the silence, to start a dialogue 
in its own language. 
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